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A LOW THRESHOLD OF GUILT:
INTERPRETING CALIFORNIA'S FETAL
MURDER STATUTE IN PEOPLE V. TAYLOR
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a pregnant woman murdered by her boyfriend in a
jealous rage. As a result of the attack, her fetus dies as well. At the
time of the attack, however, the boyfriend did not know of the
woman's pregnancy. In People v. Taylor' the California Supreme
Court held that regardless of whether a defendant knew of the
woman's pregnancy when he attacked her, the defendant may be
liable for the murder of the fetus.
2
Although the California Supreme Court addressed different
aspects of California's murder statute in previous cases, the court had
yet to examine the issue concerning the defendant's state of mind
with respect to the fetus. The defendant argued that the court must
find that he acted with malice toward the fetus specifically in order to
be charged with implied malice murder. 3 Thus, the court had to
determine whether it was sufficient for the defendant to have acted
with malice toward life in general or toward the fetus specifically.4
The Taylor court adopted the latter interpretation.
5
In so holding, the Taylor court apparently went against
legislative intent. The legislature arguably intended to treat the
murder of human beings and fetuses differently as evidenced by the
fact that the statute mentions them separately. 6 Additionally, the
1. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2004).
2. Id. at 882.
3. Id. at 885.
4. See id. at 886.
5. See id.
6. This is evidenced by the fact that CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp.
2006) deals with murder generally, but CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West
Supp. 2006) deals specifically with fetal murder. See infra Part II.
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legislature has yet to make fetal manslaughter a crime,7 thus
indicating its desire to not have the murders of each victim parallel
one another.
In addition to going against legislative intent, the Taylor court's
holding may have an impact on the abortion debate. Because of its
broad interpretation of section 187, the court's decision arguably
supports the contention that the killing of a fetus, regardless of the
method used, is murder. Pro-life advocates could use the holding in
Taylor to advance the argument that if a fetus is treated as a person in
the context of murder, then it also should be treated as a person in the
realm of abortion.
This Comment contends that the Taylor court's holding ran
afoul of legislative intent when it interpreted California's murder
statute in such a broad manner. Part II outlines the two California
Penal Code statutes that comprise a majority of the Taylor court's
holding. Part III summarizes the facts in Taylor and provides the
procedural background to the California Supreme Court opinion.
Part IV discusses the reasoning of the court's decision in Taylor
including the majority's holding as well as Justice Kennard's dissent.
Part V argues that the court's holding goes against legislative intent
and ignores the notion of fairness embedded within California
criminal statutes. Part VI discusses the implications of the court's
holding. Part VI examines how the court's holding potentially
undermines a woman's right to an abortion. It then discusses the
pressure felt within state legislatures to pass fetal murder laws or to
broadly interpret their current laws as a result of the recent publicity
surrounding the issue.
II. BACKGROUND: CALIFORNIA'S MURDER
STATUTE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF MALICE
The California Supreme Court's decision in Taylor centered
around two important California Penal Code sections.
Understanding these statutes is imperative to understanding the
court's analysis and why the court rendered an incorrect decision.
As discussed below, Taylor required the court to determine whether
under sections 187 and 188, a defendant, unaware of the victim's
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 2006) (failing to add the
same inclusive language of "fetus" as was added to section 187).
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pregnancy, may nonetheless be convicted of second degree murder
of the fetus.8
A. Section 187: California's Murder Statute
Determining whether a defendant was guilty of killing the fetus,
required the court to first look at California's murder statute. Section
187, subsection (a) defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." 9 As one might
expect, California's murder statute did not always contain the term
"fetus." In fact, from 1872 until 1970, California's murder statute
defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being, with
malice aforethought."' 0 Because the statute did not specifically
include fetal murder, California courts "held that only children who
were born alive fell within the protection of section 187." 1
In 1970, however, the California legislature amended the statute
to include the term "fetus" within the basic murder statute, thus
making the killing of a fetus a crime.' 2 This amendment came about
after the California Supreme Court ruled in Keeler v. Superior Court
that because an unborn fetus was not considered a human being
within the meaning of section 187 at the time of the case, the
defendant could not be found guilty of murdering the fetus.'
3
Although the 1970 amendment included fetuses within its
definition of murder, it left the term "fetus" undefined. This left
California courts to determine the meaning of the term through case
law. Consequently, when the United States Supreme Court came
8. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 882 (Cal. 2004).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). Because a
woman has a right to an abortion, the California legislature included an
exception to section 187 so as to protect this right. Id. § 187(b). Specifically,
section 187 does not "apply to any person who commits an act that results in
the death of a fetus if... [t]he act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to
by the mother of the fetus."
10. Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 619 (Cal.
1970) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
11. Katherine B. Folger, When Does Life Begin... or End? The California
Supreme Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
237, 242 (1994) (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 624).
12. Robert A. Pugsley, State Can Work to Protect Fetuses From Their
Parents, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 16, 2004, at G1.
13. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 622.
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down with its decision in Roe v. Wade, 14 California courts believed
this decision gave them some guidance with respect to the meaning
of "fetus" within section 187. In fact, after the Court's holding,
California courts placed a viability limitation on the fetal provision
within section 187.15
In Roe, the Supreme Court defined viability as the point at
which the "fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb,"'16 which usually occurs at about seven
months.17 In accordance with this definition, the Supreme Court held
that until viability, the State has no legitimate interest in protecting
potential human life. 18 At the point of viability, however, the State
may restrict abortion.' 
9
In accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Roe,
California state courts held that the term "fetus" within section 187
only referred to viable fetuses. In applying the Court's holding in
Roe to its current case, the California Court of Appeal in People v.
Smith, reasoned that "one cannot destroy independent human life
prior to the time it has come into existence."
21
In 1994, however, the California Supreme Court in People v.
Davis22 finally clarified the meaning of "fetus" within section 187.
The court in Davis held that viability is not a required element of
fetal murder under section 187;23 however, the prosecution must
prove that the fetus progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven
to eight weeks.24
In so holding, the Davis court broke away from the California
courts' long tradition of following the Supreme Court's holding in
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. Folger, supra note 11, at 247.
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
17. Id. at 160.
18. See id. at 163.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (Ct. App. 1976)
(following the holding in Roe v. Wade and construing the term "fetus" to refer
to a "viable unborn child" within the meaning of section 187), overruled by
People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
21. Id. at 502.
22. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
23. Id. at 593.
24. Id. at 602.
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Roe with respect to the viability requirement. 5 In explaining its
departure, the court held that Roe principles were simply inconsistent
with a statute such as section 187.26 The Davis court viewed the
decision in Roe as very narrow and only applicable when a state's
interest in protecting potential life is weighed against a mother's
right to privacy.27 Therefore, the court held that "when the mother's
privacy interests are not at stake, the Legislature may determine
whether, and at what point, it should protect life inside a mother's
womb from homicide. 28 The Davis court found no such threat to a
mother's right to privacy and thus eliminated the viability
29requirement that had been read into the statute. In accordance with
this decision, the current precedent regarding fetal murder does not
require viability under section 187.
B. Section 188: The Requirement of Malice
For a conviction of murder, California law requires more than
simply an "unlawful killing"; the defendant needs to have acted with
malice.30  Section 188 states that malice can be either express or
implied.3' Malice is "express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature."
32
Malice is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart."
33
California courts have noted that the definition of implied
malice within section 188 provides little direction when determining
whether the defendant has the required mental state for a murder
conviction.34  Additionally, section 188 along with section 187,
provides no guidance as to how the requirement of malice should be
25. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 594-95 (Cal. 1994) (discussing the
departure from Roe by the California Supreme Court).
26. See id. at 597.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 599.
29. See id.
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 2005) (defining murder as "the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought").
31. Id. § 188 (defining malice)
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 203 (Cal. 1989).
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applied to fetuses.35 As a result of this lack of clarity, courts clarified
the statute by holding that malice is implied "when the killing results
from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person
who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who
acts with conscious disregard for life."
36
When determining what constitutes malice, it is important as
well as helpful to note that malice contains both a physical and a
mental component.37 "The physical component is satisfied by the
performance of an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life. The mental component is the requirement that the
defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and
acts with a conscious disregard for life."
38
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Harold Wayne Taylor, met the victim, Patty
Fansler in the spring of 1997.39 The two dated and then subsequently
moved in together.4 ° In July 1998, Fansler and Taylor separated.4'
One of Fansler's friends heard Taylor threaten to kill Fansler and
anyone close to her if she left him.42 Following the dissolution of
their relationship, Taylor told one of Fansler's friends that he was
having great difficulty dealing with the break up and if he was unable
to have her, then no one else could either.
43
On January 1, 1999, a police officer responded to a call where
he found Fansler "upset and crying" and she alleged that Taylor
raped her.44 Consequently, the police officer arrested Taylor and
Fansler obtained a restraining order against him.45
35. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 188 (West Supp. 2006).
36. See, e.g., Dellinger, 783 P.2d at 201.
37. People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1989).
38. Id. (quoting People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 285 (Cal. 1981) (internal
quotes omitted)).
39. People v. Taylor, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 445 (Ct. App. 2002).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 882 (Cal. 2004).
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After the first of the year, Fansler requested that her manager
change her shifts at work because she did not want Taylor to know
when she was working.4 6 Shortly thereafter, on January 20, Taylor
tailgated Fansler on two separate occasions and Fansler reported the
incidents to the police department, indicating that Taylor was
"swearing behind her" and that she "was scared of him.",47
Early in the evening of March 9, 1999, Fansler and her three
children spent time at the apartment of her boyfriend, John
48Benback. John lived with his son, John, Jr. (J.J), within the same
complex as Fansler.49 After spending some time with her boyfriend,
Fansler returned to her apartment alone.5 ° Sometime after doing so,
Taylor arrived at Fansler's apartment. 5'
At around 8:30 p.m., J.J. and Fansler's son, Robert, went back to
Fansler's apartment. 52 After knocking on the front door, Robert
heard muffled screams, but was unable to get in because the door
was locked.53 After obtaining a key to the apartment, they opened
the door and spotted Taylor leaving, but failed to catch him.54 In the
apartment, Robert, J.J., and John found Fansler lying on the bed,
bleeding. 55  The apartment was trashed and there was blood
everywhere.
56
Fansler died of a single gunshot wound.57 She had a laceration
on the back of her head as well as bruising on her neck, legs, and
elbows.58  The laceration on her head spanned her entire scalp,
penetrating her skull and chipping the bone.59 Fansler's autopsy
revealed that she was pregnant and the fetus was between eleven and
46. Id.
47. Taylor, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
48. Id. at 446-47.
49. Id. at 447.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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thirteen weeks old. The fetus died as a result of its mother's death. 60
The examining pathologist noted that he could not tell whether
Fansler, who weighed approximately 200 pounds, was pregnant by
simply looking at her.
61
The night of the murder, Taylor called a friend, Jeremy Lugger,
and asked him to provide his alibi.62 The following morning, Taylor
called another friend, James Gravlee, and asked him to recover a
handgun in some bushes near Fansler's apartment. 63 Because he
feared getting involved, Gravlee led the police to the handgun with
Taylor's fingerprints on it as well as the sweatshirt that Taylor wore
at the time of the murder. 64 Gravlee also revealed to the police that
Taylor admitted to shooting Fansler. The police subsequently
arrested Taylor on March 10, 1999.65
At the jury trial, the prosecution attempted to convict Taylor on
a theory of second degree implied malice murder as to the fetus.
6 6
The jury found Taylor guilty of two counts of second degree murder
and sentenced him to sixty-five years to life in prison. 67 Taylor
appealed and urged the court to reverse the second degree murder
conviction of the fetus.
68
The Court of Appeal reversed Taylor's second degree murder
conviction as to the fetus. 6 9 The court held that while the physical
component was satisfied, there was "not an iota of evidence that
[Taylor] knew his conduct endangered fetal life and acted with
disregard of that fetal life."7 ° The court further noted that when
charged with second degree murder of a fetus, it is necessary to
prove the malice aforethought as to the fetus separately. 7' The court
explained that implied malice involves a "subjective assessment of
60. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2004).
61. Id.
62. Taylor, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Taylor, 86 P.3d at 883.
67. Id.
68. Taylor, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
69. Id. at 444.
70. Id. at 452.
71. Id. at450.
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whether the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved.72 The
court feared that if it found the implied malice component satisfied
with respect to the fetus, it would eliminate the subjective mental
component of implied malice.73 In applying the separate requirement
of malice aforethought for the fetus, the court concluded that "[t]he
undetectable early pregnancy was too latent and remote a risk factor
to bear on [Taylor's] liability or the gravity of his offense. 74
Following this decision, the Attorney General petitioned the
California Supreme Court for review, which the supreme court
granted.75
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority's Holding in Taylor
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.76
The court found that a defendant may be held liable for second
degree murder of a fetus even if he did not know of the woman's
pregnancy.77 The court accordingly found Taylor guilty of second
degree murder of the fetus that died as a result of Taylor shooting
Fansler.
78
The central issue within Taylor rested on whether Taylor met the
requirements for implied malice with respect to the killing of the
fetus. According to the court,
When a defendant commits an act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to human life, with a conscious
disregard for life in general, he acts with implied malice
towards those he ends up killing. There is no requirement
that the defendant specifically know of the existence of
each victim.
79
To illustrate the court's view of implied malice, it cited to
72. Id. at 451.
73. Id. at 453.
74. Id. at 452.
75. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2004).
76. Id. at 882.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 886.
79. Id. at 884.
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People v. Watson where a defendant killed a mother and her
daughter while driving under the influence of alcohol.81 The court
found that the evidence supported a conclusion that the defendant
answer on two counts of implied malice second degree murder.
82
The Taylor court emphasized that nowhere in its decision in Watson
did it indicate a requirement that the defendant possess a "subjective
awareness of his particular victims-that is, the mother and daughter
killed-for an implied malice murder charge to proceed., 83 The
court concluded its case comparison by stating that nothing in the
language of section 187, subdivision (a) indicated that a different
analysis should be applied when the killing of a fetus is involved.84
The majority in Taylor noted that the defendant knowingly put
human life at risk when he fired into an occupied apartment
building. 85 If Taylor fired down the hall of an apartment complex
through closed doors, he would be liable for all those killed by his
bullets. 86 In fact, the defendant would be guilty of second degree
murder if one of his bullets struck an infant hiding under the bed
covers. 87 The majority equated the above situation with the killing of
a fetus by reasoning that there is no basis on which to require Taylor
to know Fansler was pregnant in order to justify his guilt as to the
second degree murder of the fetus.88 In applying its holding to the
present case, the court stated that "[i]n battering and shooting
Fansler, [Taylor] acted with knowledge of the danger to and
conscious disregard for life in general. That is all that is required for
implied malice murder. He did not need to be specifically aware
how many potential victims his conscious disregard for life
endangered." 89
The court further bolstered its view of implied malice by
80. People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1981).
81. Id. at281.
82. See id.
83. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 884 (Cal. 2004).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 884-85.
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comparing section 187 with section 12022.9.90 Section 12022.9
provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who "knows or
reasonably should know the victim is pregnant" and who "personally
inflicts injury upon a pregnant woman that results in the termination
of the pregnancy." 91 The court reasoned that the fact that the
legislature specifically included a knowledge requirement within
section 12022.9, but not in section 187, indicated the legislature did
not intend to impose such a knowledge requirement for implied
malice murder.92
The court quickly disposed of the defendant's argument that the
legislature's separate inclusion of the term "fetus" in section 187 as
opposed to including fetuses under the definition of human beings
indicated the legislature's desire to modify the existing law of
murder.93 The court noted that the legislative history of section 187
contained no indication of intent to alter the established definition of
implied malice for purposes of the new crime of fetal murder.94 The
court ultimately concluded that "by engaging in the conduct he did,
[Taylor] demonstrated a conscious disregard for all life, fetal or
otherwise, and hence is liable for all deaths caused by his conduct."
95
Finally, the defendant asserted that California's failure to make
either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter of a fetus a crime
indicated that the legislature intended to restrict the crime of fetal
murder to those who specifically intended to kill the fetus or at least
to those who knew their attack on the mother would be harmful to
the fetus. 9 6 The defendant reasoned that it did not follow logically
that the legislature would exclude both types of manslaughter, yet
still label the defendant's less cognizant conduct as fetal murder.
97
In response to this argument, the court simply stated that the fact the
legislature chose to amend section 187 to include the murder of a
fetus, but also refused to amend the manslaughter statute had no
90. Id. at 885; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West 2000).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West 2005).
92. Taylor, 86 P.3d at 885.
93. Id. at 886.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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bearing on the proper interpretation of California's murder statute.
98
B. Justice Kennard's Dissent
As the only dissenting justice within Taylor, Justice Kennard
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 187.
Accordingly, Justice Kennard argued that "a defendant is guilty of
murdering a fetus on an implied malice theory only if the fetus's
death resulted from the defendant's intentional act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to fetal life, with knowledge of
that particular danger."
99
Justice Kennard emphasized that the legislature defined murder
with respect to two different types of victims-human beings and
fetuses. 00 In doing so, she contended that it is possible that the
legislature intended to treat the murder of these two types of victims
differently. 10 Otherwise, the legislature would have included the
term "fetus" under the definition of a human being for purposes of
section 187.102 Consequently, Justice Kennard disagreed with the
majority's assertion that "for a conviction of implied malice murder
of a fetus, it is sufficient that the person acted with conscious
disregard 'for life in general.' 10 3 Justice Kennard argued that the
majority's view eliminates the legislature's intended distinction
between human beings and fetuses.'0
4
Justice Kennard agreed with the defendant's argument that the
fact that the legislature did not make fetal manslaughter a crime
indicated that the legislature did not intend for the crime of fetal
murder to parallel the murder of a human being.10 5 To further her
argument, she gave an example of where the effect of omitting the
crime of fetal manslaughter is evident. Her scenario was as follows:
Finding his wife in bed with another man, the defendant shoots his
98. Id.
99. Id. at 887 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (first and second emphasis added)
(emphasis omitted).
100. Id. at 886.
101. See id. at 890.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 886.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 888-89.
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wife, unaware of the fact that she is nine weeks pregnant.' ° 6 He is
charged with the death of both the mother and the fetus.'1 7 At the
trial, however, the jury finds that he acted in the heat of passion and
accordingly finds him guilty of manslaughter with respect to the
killing of his wife.10 8 Because manslaughter does not contain the
requirement of malice, 10 9 the jury cannot convict the defendant of
murdering the fetus, nor can it convict the defendant of the lesser
offense of manslaughter because California does not make fetal
manslaughter a crime.1 0 Therefore, the defendant is only liable for
the death of his wife and not the fetus. 111 In response to the outcome
within this scenario, Justice Kennard concluded that the fact that the
"same murderous conduct is punished differently depending upon the
type of victim, either a human being or a fetus, implies that the
Legislature intended to treat fetal murders differently.""
2
Justice Kennard ended her dissent by urging the legislature to
amend section 187 to clarify whether it intended to retain the same
mental state for both human beings and fetuses. 113 Justice Kennard
argued that the language of section 187 is unclear and because of this
lack of clarity, any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the
defendant, under California's rule of lenity. 114 Therefore, she would
hold that without a clear indication of what mental state the
legislature intended to apply for a fetus, a defendant unaware of the
mother's pregnancy should not be liable for the implied malice
murder of a fetus that dies as a result of an attack on the mother. 
5
106. Id. at 888.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2005) (defining manslaughter as the
"unlawful killing of a human being without malice").
110. Taylor, 86 P.3d at 889 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 890.
114. Id.; see generally People v. Avery, 38 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 2002) (explaining
the rule of "lenity," which states that "when a statute defining a crime or
punishment is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, the appellate court
should ordinarily adopt that interpretation more favorable to the defendant").
115. Taylor, 86 P.3d at 890 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN TAYLOR
Since its amendment in 1970, statutory interpretation of section
187 has proven difficult because the statute does not specifically
state whether fetuses and human beings should receive similar
treatment with respect to the charge of implied malice murder." 
6
Despite this lack of clarity, the majority in Taylor held that it was
sufficient for an implied malice murder conviction of a fetus that the
defendant acted with "a conscious disregard for all life, fetal or
otherwise."'1 17 In so holding, the court destroyed the distinction that
the legislature specifically embedded within the statute between
human beings and fetuses.
Up until its amendment in 1970, section 187 remained
unchanged since its enactment in 1872.118 Assembly member, Craig
Biddle, introduced the amendment. 119 Biddle originally intended to
include a fetus beyond the twenty weeks of uterogestation as a
human being under both the murder and manslaughter statutes.' 20 In
opposition to the bill, Senator Clark Bradley and Senator George
Deukmejian urged Biddle to make certain changes to the bill. 121
Senator Bradley insisted that the bill not change the law with regard
to manslaughter.1 22 Senator Bradley contended that the purpose of
including a fetus within the definition of murder "was the
defendant's extreme culpability, and since the same level of purpose
was not involved with manslaughter, [Biddle's] change should not
apply.... 1 23  Additionally, Senator Deukmejian suggested that if
the term "fetus" was only included in the murder statute and not
placed under the definition of a human being, those who objected to
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 2006).
117. Taylor, 86 P.3d at 886 (emphasis added).
118. Borden D. Webb, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child
Homicide-California's Law to Punish the Willful Killing of a Fetus, 2 PAC.
L.J. 170,170 (1971).
119. Assemb. B. 816, 1970 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1970) (as amended June
24, 1970).
120. Id.
121. Webb, supra note 118, at 174.
122. See id.
123. Id.
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the bill on its definitional basis would be appeased. 124
In the end, both Senator Deukmejian's and Senator Bradley's
suggestions prevailed. Although this bill added fetuses to the realm
of murder under California law as the underlying motive behind the
bill intended, Biddle's original intent was lost in the bill's final
version. The assembly bill did not change California's manslaughter
statute to include the term "fetus," nor did the murder statute include
fetuses within its definition of a human being. 12 5 Rather, only the
murder statute included the term "fetus" and it was separate from the
phrase "human beings" within that statute.
126
Excluding both of Biddle's original suggestions indicated that
the legislature ultimately decided to treat the murder of human
beings and fetuses differently with respect to the required mental
state of malice; they were not intended to parallel one another.
Specifically, the current version of section 187 includes both fetuses
and human beings as separate terms under the statute,127 implying the
legislature's intent to analyze them separately when determining a
defendant's guilt. Additionally, by not criminalizing fetal man-
slaughter, the legislature implied that it required some form of malice
specifically directed at the fetus in order for a defendant to be
convicted of murdering the fetus. Thus, the court's holding that it is
sufficient for a defendant to have a conscious disregard for life in
general runs afoul of legislative intent. Instead, the courts should be
looking at the defendant's mental state with respect to the fetus
specifically, not toward life in general.
Much of California's criminal law centers around a defendant's
state of mind when he committed the crime. 128  And, when he
124. See id.
125. Assemb. B. 816, 1970 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1970) (as amended by the
Senate, Aug. 7, 1970) (indicating that the suggested amendment to California's
manslaughter statute had been stricken as well as the portion of the bill that
included fetuses under the statute's definition of a human being).
126. Id.
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 2006).
128. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West Supp. 2006) (defining battery as
"any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another")
(emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 302 (West 2005) ("Every person who
intentionally disturbs or disquiets any assemblage of people met for religious
worship... is guilty of a misdemeanor") (emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 350(a) (West 2005) ("Any person who willfully manufactures, intentionally
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possesses no knowledge of the woman's pregnancy, then he is given
no warning of the potential for criminal liability for killing the
unborn, invisible fetus. In fact, generally "a law must give sufficient
warning of prohibited behavior so that individuals may conduct
themselves accordingly."'1 29 Therefore, to punish a defendant for
killing a fetus that he neither knew nor should have known existed,
seems to go against our notions of fundamental fairness embedded
within the California Penal Code.
In accordance with the California Penal Code's implicit
concerns with notions of fundamental fairness, it seems unlikely that
the legislature intended to pass such a broad sweeping piece of
legislation. In addition to the fact that a defendant can be found
guilty of implied malice murder of a fetus, the California Supreme
Court held prior to Taylor that viability is not an element of fetal
murder under section 187.130 The lack of a viability requirement,
combined with the court's application of implied malice in Taylor,
demonstrates that a defendant is subjected to an extended risk of
liability under the statute before even knowing the woman is
pregnant. 13 1 Therefore, under the court's current interpretation of
section 187, a defendant may be found guilty of implied malice
murder of a fetus only after a mere seven to eight weeks after
conception without any knowledge of the pregnancy.
Furthermore, under section 190.2 a defendant "convicted of
more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree" within
the same proceeding, is eligible for either capital punishment or the
lesser alternative of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. 132 The California Supreme Court has held that fetal murder is
applicable under this statute. 133 In looking at criminal liability as
sells, or knowingly possesses for sale any counterfeit of a mark registered with
the Secretary of State or registered on the Principal Register of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, shall, upon conviction, be punishable")
(emphasis added).
129. Alison Tsao, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence
or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HAST[NGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 472
(1998).
130. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 593 (Cal. 1994).
131. Id. at 616 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 2006).
133. People v. Dennis, 950 P.2d 1035, 1059 (Cal. 1998).
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applied to fetuses under section 187, in conjunction with the
multiple-murder special circumstances under section 190.2, a
defendant's punishment for committing such a crime seems not only
likely, but severe. Clearly, the legislature intended to punish such
heinous crimes, but it seems unlikely that the legislature intended
such a seemingly unfair and unyielding result.
In addition to section 190.2, section 12022.9 provides a sentence
enhancement in certain circumstances when harm to a pregnant
woman results in the death of the fetus.' 34 The enhancement requires
that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the
woman was pregnant.' 35 As previously mentioned, the Taylor court
used the specific knowledge requirement embedded within section
12022.9 to support its holding.1 36 The court found that the absence
of such a requirement within section 187 indicated the legislature did
not intend to impose such a knowledge requirement for implied
malice murder. 37 In comparing section 187 with section 12022.9, it
seems odd that knowledge of the woman's pregnancy would be
required for a sentence enhancement, but not for a charge of murder.
One would assume that a charge of murder, arguably the most severe
crime, would carry a higher knowledge requirement than a simple
sentence enhancement. But under the Taylor court's interpretation, a
defendant can be convicted of second degree murder of a fetus and
be subject to the multiple-murder special circumstance under 190.2,
yet not receive a sentence enhancement under 12022.9, which is
clearly the lesser of the three punishments. The legislature could not
have intended this paradoxical result.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Because of the severe interpretation of section 187, the court's
decision in Taylor has broad implications. This decision sets a
dangerous precedent which could conceivably be used to impact the
abortion debate. Specifically, the court's decision has the potential
to bolster the argument that the killing of a fetus, regardless of the
method, is murder. Additionally, the broad interpretation and
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9 (West 2005).
135. Id.
136. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 885 (Cal. 2004).
137. Id.
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concern surrounding the issue will likely prompt other states to
follow suit and punish these violent acts as severely as California
currently does.
A. The Effect of Taylor on Abortion
Many abortion-rights advocates fear the Taylor court's decision
as possible support along with other feticide laws for the movement
to outlaw abortion and overturn Roe v. Wade.138 There is grave
concern among these advocates that decisions such as Taylor
combined with fetal murder laws will be used by judges and anti-
choice propagandists to undermine a woman's right to choose.'
39
Recognizing a fetus as a person in the criminal context leaves the
door open to allow the same interpretation in the abortion context.
140
By equating the killing of a human being with the killing of a fetus,
the fetus is provided with a legal status. Additionally, this indicates
that women and their unborn fetuses are of equal worth and the
taking of their lives should be similarly punished.
The recognition and equating of life worth in the criminal
context has the potential to seep into the abortion context and
infringe upon a woman's right to an abortion. Such a problem was
envisioned with the Unborn Victims of Violence Act ("UVVA"), a
federal act similar to state fetal murder laws. 141 Shortly before the
court's decision in Taylor, Congress passed the UVVA. 142  The
UVVA makes it a crime to kill a fetus during the commission of a
federal offense.1 43  The defendant does not have to have prior
knowledge of the pregnancy in order to be found guilty.' 44 Further,
the UVVA refers to a fetus as a "child in utero" and defines a fetus
as any "member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
138. Peter Blumberg, High Court Keeps Pro-Life, Pro-Choice Camps
Guessing, S.F. DAILY J., Apr. 13, 2004, at 1.
139. Id.
140. Tsao, supra note 129, at 470.
141. 10 U.S.C. § 919a(a)(1) (Supp. 2004); Kate Snow, Laci's Family
Endorses "Unborn Victims" Bill, CNN, May 8, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/07/laci.bill/.
142. Mike McKee, Killing of Fetus, Intentional or Not, Still Murder, THE
RECORDER, Apr. 6, 2004, at 1.
143. 10 U.S.C. § 919a(b) (2000).
144. Id.
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development, who is carried in the womb."' 145  Conversely,
California law requires that the fetus be at least seven to eight weeks
old at the time of the murder in order to charge a defendant with the
crime. 146 Significantly, the passage of the UVVA marked the first
time a federal statute recognized and granted rights to a fetus.1
47
In response to whether the UVVA would impact abortion rights,
Senator Orrin Hatch responded, "They say it undermines abortion
rights. It does undermine it [but the] partisan arguments over
abortion should not stop a bill that protects women and children.' 48
Similarly, with respect to the UVVA, Senator Dianne Feinstein
expressed concern that "[t]hese federal laws, along with more than
350 anti-choice measures enacted by States, are setting legal
precedents that abortion opponents will use to challenge Roe v.
Wade, which is perilously close to being overturned... It is entirely
possible that abortion will once again be illegal in this country."'
149
Senator Hatch's and Senator Feinstein's responses to the
possible impact of the UVVA on abortion rights undoubtedly
sparked concern among abortion rights advocates. Additionally, the
passage of feticide laws in both the states and Congress, highly
suggests that a woman's right to choose is potentially at risk of being
eliminated or at least diminished by legislation that broadly defines
the requirements of fetal murder.' 50  Although both California's
145. 10 U.S.C. § 919a(d) (Supp. 2004); see also Memorandum from ACLU
Washington National Office to Interested Persons (June 17, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/fetalrights/15351eg20030617.html
[hereinafter ACLU Memo] (stating that by applying to any stage of prenatal
development, the UVVA will be the "first federal law to recognize a zygote
(fertilized egg), a blastocyst (pre-implantation embryo), an embryo (through
week eight of a pregnancy), or a fetus as an independent 'victim' of a crime,
with legal rights distinct from the woman who has been harmed by criminal
conduct").
146. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 602 (Cal. 1994).
147. Megan Fitzpatrick, Fetal Personhood After the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 553, 554 (2006).
148. Snow, supra note 141.
149. 150 CONG. REG. S4371 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
150. See ACLU Memo, supra note 145 (stating that UVVA undermines a
woman's right to make decisions about her pregnancy and health by
"separate[ing] the woman from her fetus in the eyes of the law").
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murder statute and the UVVA contain exceptions for legal abortion
procedures, 15 1 there is no solid guarantee that the continued validity
of Roe will require such exceptions in the future. 152 In fact, the
UVVA's congressional supporters refused an amendment to the
UVVA that expressly stated that the bill should not be construed in a
manner that would limit a woman's right to an abortion."5 3 This
further demonstrates that at the federal level, there is a growing trend
that criminal laws affecting fetal life are being viewed as coextensive
with the laws governing the right to life under abortion. Exclusion of
the amendment further provides support for the erosion of women's
abortion rights.
The implementation of fetal murder laws combined with the
UVVA and the potential for other states to follow suit, may play
some role in an overturning of Roe should the court revisit the issue
in the near future. Arguably, the court's decision in Taylor and the
UVVA's lack of a viability requirement seem to indicate that the
distinction between fetal murder and abortion is already beginning to
disappear. 154  Although the state clearly has some interest in
protecting fetal life and punishing those who harm pregnant women
and their unborn fetuses, the Taylor court's broad interpretation of
section 187 seems to indicate that the state's interest in the issue is
growing. And not only is the state's interest in fetal life growing, but
the protection afforded to fetuses is also increasing. Now, a
defendant can be convicted of murdering a fetus when he did not
even know that the woman he harmed was pregnant.
155
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (c)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2004); CAL. PENAL CODE §
187(b)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2006).
152. A lengthy discussion of Roe would be outside the scope of this
Comment. Revisiting Roe would encompass the constitutional issue of a
woman's right to privacy, which would be a much larger issue than simply
defining a fetus as a person in the criminal context and prosecuting a defendant
responsible for its murder.
153. H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 56 (2004) (illustrating that Representative
Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) offered an amendment to the UVVA that stated
"[n]othing in [the UVVA] shall be construed as undermining a woman's right
to choose an abortion as guaranteed by the United States Constitution or
limiting in any way the rights and freedoms of pregnant women").
154. Under the UVVA, an "unborn child" is defined as a child in utero "at
any stage of development." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 2006).
155. People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881, 882 (Cal. 2004).
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Taylor's broad interpretation of section 187 may be used as
support for undermining a woman's right to an abortion. A holding
such as the one in Taylor is viewed by pro-life advocates as a
victory. 156  Opponents characterize the UVVA as simply another
instance in which a fetus is being treated as a person and thus
afforded a great deal of protection. 157 Instances such as this "set[]
the stage for a jurist to acknowledge that human beings at any stage
of development deserve protection-even protection that would
trump a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy."' 158 In addition
to California's broad interpretation, and Federal legislation, the
growing trend in other states bolsters the anti-abortion position.
B. Fetal Murder Laws Are a Growing
Trend within the United States
Because of the states' desire to punish violent assaults and
discourage domestic violence as well as drunk driving, fetal murder
laws are a growing trend among state legislatures.' 59 Additionally,
with headline-grabbing cases like the infamous Scott Peterson
murder trial, states feel compelled to take action against violent
offenders who harm a pregnant woman and her unborn child. 160 This
pressure is also felt at the federal level as evidenced by the passage
of the UVVA. Despite these similar pressures, the states are not
united in how they punish such offensive crimes.
Although fetal murder laws vary among the states, thirty-two
states today recognize the unlawful killing of an unborn child in at
least some circumstances.' 6 1 While some states impose a viability
156. For example, Samuel Casey, executive director and CEO of the
Christian Legal Society, stated "[i]n as many areas as we can, we want to put
on the books that the embryo is a person." Aaron Zitner, Abortion Foes Attack
Roe on New Research, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003 at Al.
157. See 151 CONG. REG. S3128 (daily ed. March 25, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein). In expressing her opposition to the UVVA, Senator Feinstein
referred to Samuel Casey's comments as indicative of how the bill can be used
to attack Roe. Id.
158. Zitner, supra note 156.
159. Tsao, supra note 129, at 480.
160. See Snow, supra note 141 (noting that twenty-six states have laws
allowing a violent crime against a pregnant woman to be treated as crimes
against two separate people).
161. Nat'l Right to Life Comm., State Homicide Laws the Recognize Unborn
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requirement, 162 other states criminalize the killing of an unborn child
at any stage of its development. 163 Additionally, while some states
recognize fetal manslaughter, 164 others only find liability where the
defendant acted with malice.'
65
The fact that Congress signed the UVVA into law just five days
prior to the court's decision in Taylor reflects the pressure felt within
the state legislature.' 66 The UVVA is commonly known as Laci and
Conor's Law,' 67 which came into existence after Scott Peterson was
accused of killing his pregnant wife, Laci and their unborn child,
Conor. 16 Because of the timing of the court's decision in Taylor and
the publicity surrounding the Peterson case, one must wonder
whether the court felt the pressure of such a publicized case when it
interpreted California's murder statute so broadly. Although the
Peterson case did not involve the issue within Taylor since Laci was
much further along in her pregnancy at the time of her murder, 169 the
court in Taylor likely responded to the Peterson case in order to
make a statement regarding how similar conduct would be punished.
The Peterson case undoubtedly opened the public's eyes to the
issue of fetal murder and public concern is a powerful political
motivator. It is possible that the recent publicity surrounding the
issue will prompt those states without such statutes to take action and
Victims, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.nrlc.org/UnbomVictims/Statehomicidelaws
092302.html.
. 162. E.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1(4) (2005) (stating that a "person who
knowingly or intentionally kills a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in
IC 16-18-2-365) commits murder, a felony").
163. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (West 2005) ("A person
commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence,.., causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child at any stage of its development").
164. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006 (2005) ("Manslaughter is the
unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human
embryo or fetus, without malice.").
165. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2005) (excluding the term "fetus"
from its definition of manslaughter).
166. McKee, supra note 142.
167. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118
Stat. 568 (2004) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 and 10 U.S.C.A.
§ 919a).
168. See Snow, supra note 141.
169. See id.
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criminalize fetal murder. Additionally, the Taylor court's holding
will likely encourage states to interpret their statutes more ex-
pansively so as to criminalize the conduct on a broader scale. And, it
might also incite state legislatures to amend their statutes and
eliminate the viability requirement or make fetal manslaughter a
crime.
VII. CONCLUSION
While many would label fetal murder as a clearly heinous crime,
distaste for such a crime does not justify construing the law in such a
manner so as to make a person liable for harming something he had
no reason to believe existed. In amending section 187, the California
legislature purposefully did not include the term "fetus" within the
definition of human beings, thus indicating that the legislature
intended to treat the murder of each type of victim differently.
Furthermore, the legislature did not make fetal manslaughter a crime,
which implied that the legislature intended the defendant to have
acted with malice toward the fetus specifically in order to convict
him of the crime.
Although the Taylor court undoubtedly appeased the public's
desire to punish such an atrocious crime, the court's actions were not
without consequences. As a result of its broad interpretation of
section 187, the court's decision began to affect criminal laws as they
apply to abortion. Pro-life advocates will likely use this decision to
bolster their view that fetal life should be protected and those who
harm fetuses regardless of the method used, should be punished.
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